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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 This appeal arises from the district court's decision 
to allow five age discrimination plaintiffs who had filed timely 
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to amend 
their complaint to add four new plaintiffs who had not.  Because 
our case law requires that, outside the context of a 
representative or class action under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., an individual plaintiff 
must file a timely administrative charge, we will reverse and 
remand.  
 I. 
 The original plaintiffs1, appellees herein, are all 
over age forty and former employees of Baker & Taylor Books.  
Each held a different position and worked at one of three 
different company locations before being terminated from  
employment during 1991.  Each filed a timely charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that his or her layoff was 
a result of a company-wide policy to rid itself of older workers.  
On February 16, 1993, they filed this lawsuit in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging 
violation of the ADEA and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12, et seq.  However, they 
did not file a class action, as permitted by ADEA § 7(b), 29 
U.S.C. § 626(b).   
                     
1
.  Walter R. Whalen, Irene W. Releford, Ronald D. Glasgow, 
Alexander G. De Palma, and Bevely M. Hopkins. 
  
 Generally, under the ADEA, "[n]o civil action may be 
commenced by an individual...until 60 days after a charge 
alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the [EEOC]."  
ADEA § 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).  It is undisputed that the five 
original plaintiffs complied with this filing requirement.  
However, on October 28, 1993, they moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 
to amend their complaint and add four new plaintiffs, Donna R. 
Baugh, Janet K. Turrell, Mary A. Panarello and Robert K. 
Williamson.  These prospective plaintiffs are also over age 40 
and former employees of Baker & Taylor who were terminated in 
19912.  They were employed in various positions and at various 
locations, and also claim they were victims of a company-wide 
push to eliminate older employees.  The controversy before us 
arises because none of these prospective plaintiffs filed timely 
EEOC charges. 
 Section 7(b) of the ADEA incorporates the enforcement 
"powers, remedies and procedures" of § 16(b) of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides, in relevant 
part, that "[a]n action...may be maintained against any employer 
(including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of 
competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in 
behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly 
situated."3  We have held previously that this provision allows 
                     
2
.  The exception is new plaintiff Baugh, who was terminated in 
1992. 
3
.  Unlike a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, under §16(b), 
no person can become a party plaintiff and no person will be 
bound by or may benefit from a judgment unless he or she has 
  
aggrieved individuals who failed to file the required § 7(d) EEOC 
charge to join a class action brought by a plaintiff who had 
filed an EEOC charge alleging class-wide discrimination.  Lusardi 
v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1077 (3d Cir. 1988); accord Lockhart 
v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 52 (3d Cir. 1989).  
The appellees argue that this rule, known as the "single filing 
rule," should be applied to ADEA non-class actions, allowing the 
prospective plaintiffs to "piggyback" onto the timely 
administrative charges filed by the appellees.    
 The Magistrate Judge denied the appellees' motion to 
amend their complaint, holding that the single filing rule has 
not been applied in this Circuit in ADEA cases that are not class 
action suits; accordingly, the Magistrate Judge held that our 
decisions in Lusardi and Lockhart require a plaintiff in a non-
class  action suit, pursuant to ADEA §7(d), to have filed a 
charge with the EEOC. 
 The district court reversed, following the analysis in 
Tolliver v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 499 U.S. 983, 111 S. Ct. 1641 (1991), which held that the 
single filing rule applies to ADEA class and non-class actions 
alike.  See also Howlett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 49 F.3d 189 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (following Tolliver).  The district court granted the 
appellants' motion to certify the order granting leave to amend 
(..continued) 
affirmatively "opted into" the class by filing a written consent 
with the court.  Nowicki v. USX Corp., 672 F. Supp. 854, 855-56 
(W.D. Pa. 1987) (citing La Chappelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 
F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975)).  
  
the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as involving a 
controlling question of law, on which there is substantial ground 
for difference of opinion, and from which an immediate appeal may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.  
In turn, we granted the appellants' petition for immediate 
appeal. 
II. 
 Because the narrow issue raised on this appeal involves 
interpretation and application of legal principles, i.e., whether 
the single filing rule is applicable to non-class action ADEA 
lawsuits, our review is plenary.  Epstein Family Partnership v. 
Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 In Lusardi, we held that an individual EEOC filing is 
not a prerequisite to opting into a § 16(b) action where the 
representative plaintiff has filed a timely charge with the EEOC 
that gives the employer notice that class-wide discrimination is 
alleged.  855 F.2d at 1078.  "So long as class issues are 
alleged, a timely charge may serve as the basis for a class 
action."  Id. (emphasis added).  However, we clearly 
distinguished class actions from other situations where a 
plaintiff seeks to "piggyback" onto a timely charge:  "To view 
opt-in suits under §16(b) as either permissive joinders or 
efforts to intervene would necessarily require that the plaintiff 
individually fulfill all of the prerequisites to suit."  Id. 
 Similarly, in Lockhart, we recognized that ADEA §7(d) 
requires a complainant to file a timely charge of discrimination 
with the EEOC and the appropriate state agency.  879 F.2d at 52.  
  
Ordinarily, a complainant who fails to file a timely charge is 
barred from seeking relief.  Id. (citations omitted).  However, 
we noted our decision in Lusardi as holding "that plaintiffs who 
had not filed charges with the EEOC could opt into an ADEA class 
action suit only if the original complainant's EEOC charge gave 
the employer notice of class-based age discrimination."  Id. at 
52-53 (emphasis added).   
 Once again, we made clear that our holding was limited 
to the context of §16(b) class actions.  We held that the 
district court erred by allowing two new plaintiffs, who had not 
filed EEOC charges, to join the suit of the original plaintiff 
because his EEOC charge did not give adequate notice of class-
based discrimination.  Id. at 53.  Significantly, however, we 
also said that the district court erred in holding 
 that the joinder of Bradley and Wilson was 
sanctioned by the permissive joinder rule of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).  In Lusardi, we recog-
nized that opt-in class action suits had been 
analogized to permissive joinder and 
intervention, but rejected such comparisons 
....  Moreover, we note that Bradley and 
Wilson could not have been joined pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a), in any event, since 
neither one had fulfilled the administrative 
requirement of filing his own timely charge 
with the EEOC. 
     
Id. n. 11. 
 Here, the appellees have not brought a § 16(b) class 
action, nor obviously, could the four prospective plaintiffs have 
filed written consents "opting into" such an action.  The 
appellees instead sought to amend their complaint pursuant to 
Rule 15(a) to add four new party plaintiffs who had failed to 
  
pursue administrative remedies.  Allowing the amendment for this 
purpose would create the same result as permissive joinder or 
intervention -- application of the single filing rule outside the 
context of a §16(b) class action -- which we rejected in Lusardi 
and Lockhart.    
 Appellees argue that the following passage in Lusardi 
supports their argument that the single filing rule applies to 
non-class actions: 
 Although the EEOC charge does not use the 
words "similarly situated" or allege speci-
fically that a class action is going to be 
brought, we fail to see how [the defendant] 
can claim prejudice by the bringing of a 
class action.  The charge clearly notifies 
[the defendant] that it allegedly discrimi-
nates against persons over forty years old as 
a class.  Accordingly, the charge provides 
sufficient notice to the parties to encourage 
meaningful conciliation, the purpose of 
requiring it....So long as class issues are 
alleged, a timely charge may serve as the 
basis for a class action. 
 
Lusardi, 855 F.2d at 1078 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  
Appellees' reliance on this passage is misplaced, because it 
states merely that a plaintiff is not required to file a "class 
charge," only allege class issues that may subsequently form the 
basis for a "class action."  There is no suggestion that filing a 
charge with allegations broad enough to support a subsequent 
class action lawsuit alleviates the burden of filing the class 
action itself, with the attendant requirement of class 
certification. 
  
 The district court acknowledged that Lusardi and 
Lockhart indicate that the single filing rule does not apply to 
non-class actions; however, it was persuaded by the analysis in 
Tolliver, supra, which held that the single filing rule applies 
equally to ADEA individual and class actions.  We conclude, 
however, that our analysis in Lusardi and Lockhart controls our 
decision here, and provides plaintiffs the option of seeking 
class certification and prospective plaintiffs who failed to seek 
a timely administrative remedy for their alleged injury the 
opportunity to opt into the class.  When, however, plaintiffs 
choose to bring suit individually, they must first satisfy the 
prerequisite of filing a timely EEOC charge.   
 Accordingly, we will reverse and remand the cause to 
the district court with instructions that it deny appellees' 
motion to amend their complaint. 
